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Recent Developments 
United States v. Knights: 
Warrantless Search of a Defendant, Authorized by a Condition of Probation and 
Supported by Reasonable Suspicion, Satisfied Fourth Amendment Requirements 
The United States Supreme Court held that a search 
pursuant to a probation condition and 
supported by reasonable suspicion, 
satisfied requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112,151 L. Ed. 
2d 497 (2001). In so holding, the 
Court determined that one's status as 
a probationer diminishes the 
reasonable expectation of privacy 
enjoyed by other citizens. Id. 
Mark James Knights (''Knights'') 
was sentenced by a California court 
to probation for a drug offense. The 
probation order specified that Knights 
submit to a "search at anytime, with 
or without a search or arrest warrant 
or reasonable cause, by any probation 
or law enforcement officer." The 
probation order, which Knights 
signed, stated immediately above his 
signature that "1 have received a copy, 
read and understand the above tern1S 
and conditions of probation and agree 
to abide by same." 
Soon after Knights was placed 
on probation, a local power 
transformer and telecommunications 
vault were pried open and set on fire. 
Police suspicion for these and thirty 
prior acts of vandalism suggested 
involvement by Knights and his friend, 
Steven Simoneau. The incidents 
began soon after the power company 
filed a theft-of-services complaint 
against Knights and discontinued his 
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electrical service for non-payment. A 
local sheriff's detective, Todd 
Hancock ("Hancock"), noticed that 
the vandalism coincided with Knight's 
court appearances concerning the 
theft. Based upon these observations, 
Hancock decided to search Knights' 
apartment. Hancock did not obtain a 
warrant for the search because he 
''was aware of the search condition in 
Knight's probation order and, thus, 
believed that a warrant was not 
necessary." Subsequentto the search, 
Knights was arrested. 
A federal grand jury indicted 
Knights for conspiracy to commit 
arson, possession of an unregistered 
destructive device, and being a felon 
in possession of ammunition. Knights 
moved to suppress the evidence 
discovered as a result of the search. 
The district court granted Knights' 
motion. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on its 
earlier decision holding that a search 
condition in a probation order "must 
be seen as limited to probation 
searches, and must stop short of 
investigation searches." The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted 
certiorari. 
The Court rejected the reasoning 
relied upon by the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, noting that the 
California Supreme Court upheld 
searches "whether the purpose of the 
search is to monitor the probationer 
or to serve some other law 
enforcement purpose." Id. (quoting 
People v. Woods, 21 Cal. 4th 668, 
681,981 P. 2d 1019,1027 (1999)). 
The Court observed that nothing in 
the condition of probation suggested 
that searches be confined to those for 
probationary purposes only. [d. The 
search condition provided that 
Knights would submitto a search "by 
any probation officer or law 
enforcement officer," with no mention 
of purpose. Id. Based on its review 
of the probation order, the Court 
limited its analysis to whether the 
Fourth Amendment limits searches 
pursuant to a probation condition to 
those with a "probationary" purpose. 
[d. 
Knights contended that a 
warrantless search of a probationer 
satisfies the Fourth Amendment only 
if it is exactly like the search at issue 
in GrifJin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 
3164 (1987). [d. at 590. In Griffin, 
the Court upheld the search of a 
probationer conducted pursuant to a 
regulation pern1itting a warrantless 
search of a probationer's home, on 
the conditions that there be 
'reasonable ground' to believe that 
contraband is present and that the 
probation officer's supervisor has 
given approval for the search. Id. 
(quoting GrifJin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709,107 S. 
32.2 U. Bait. L.F. 27 
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Ct. 3164 (1987)). The regulation, at 
issue in Griffin, "was not an express 
part of Griffin's probation." Id. The 
Court held that a "state's operation 
of its probation system presented a 
'special need' for the 'exercise of 
supervision to assure that probation 
restrictions are in fact observed.'" Id. 
The special need justified Wisconsin's 
regulation and, therefore, the search 
pursuant to it was reasonable. Id. 
Additionally, the Court held that 
"probation diminishes a probationer's 
reasonable expectation of privacy-
so that a probation officer may, 
consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, search a probationer's 
home without a warrant and with only 
'reasonable grounds' (not probable 
cause) to believe that contraband is 
present." Id. at 591. The Court went 
further to state that, by upholding the 
constitutionality of the search in 
Griffin, it was not implicitly holding 
that any search not like it is 
unconstitutional. Id. Because the 
Court found that the search of 
Knights' home was reasonable under 
a totality of the circumstances analysis, 
it was unnecessary to address whether 
Knights' acceptance of the search 
condition constituted consent in the 
sense of a waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. Id. at 591. 
The Court, in analyzing the 
Fourth Amendment, expressed that 
reasonableness is the "touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment" and "is 
determined by 'assessing, on one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes 
upon an individual's privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion oflegitimate 
governmental interests. '" Id. (quoting 
32.2 U. Bait L.F. 28 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 300 (1999)). Knights, as a 
probationer, was touched by both 
sides of the balancing test for 
reasonableness. Id. Because 
probation is a criminal sanction 
imposed by the court upon an 
offender, it is inherent that 
probationers will not, and do not, 
enjoy the absolute liberties to which 
other citizens are entitled. Id. The 
Court explained that any court 
granting probation may impose 
reasonable conditions that deprive an 
offender of some freedoms enjoyed 
by law-abiding citizens. /d. "The 
probation order clearly expressed the 
search condition and Knights was 
unambiguously informed of it. " Id. at 
592. Therefore, the condition 
significantly diminished Knight's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. 
In assessing the government's 
interests, the Court observed that 
there are two concerns: rehabilitation 
and preventing recidivism. Id. If the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
was correct in its holding, the 
government would be forced to focus 
only on the first concern while ignoring 
the latter concern. Id. The Court's 
holding, however, justifies the 
government's focus on probationers 
in ways not constitutionally pennitted 
for the ordinary citizen. Id. 
Finally, the Court held that 
although the Fourth Amendment 
ordinarily requires probable cause, the 
balancing of the competing 
considerations requires no more than 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
search of a probationer's house. Id. 
A lesser degree of probability satisfies 
the Constitution when balancing the 
interests of the government against 
those of private citizens. Id. The 
Court held that the same 
circumstances that led it to find that 
"reasonable SUspICIon is 
constitutionally sufficient [for a search] 
also render a warrant requirement 
unnecessary." Id. 
The holding in United States v. 
Knights is a reflection of the "tough 
on crime" attitude now prevalent in the 
United States. The holding allows law 
enforcement to target convicted 
criminals on probation without 
observing the same procedural 
safeguards, as they would have to with 
other citizens. In the instant case, the 
Court affirms the erosion of the 
expectation of privacy for certain 
classes of people, specifically 
probationers, because the govern-
ment's interests in protecting citizens 
and reducing crime outweigh those of 
probationers. 
